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In the Supreme Cowt 
of the State of U tab 
EDWARD A. KNAUS and EDNA 
Ki\1AUS~ his wife, 
P la,inti ff s and A p p e 1/antJ j 
vs .. 
JAMES EARL SMITH and ZELDA 
P. SMITH, his. "·ife, 
R. V. MANNING and LOIS MAN-
NING, his vlife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9071 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Respondents cannot agree with appellants~ statement of 
the case~ nor with the statement of appellants as to the points 
raised by this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves a dispute over ownership of a strip 
of ground approximately 6 feet wide and 227 feet in depth 
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at 6 76 East 48th South Street, Murray) Utah, and worth $200.00 
(R. 113). As Case No~ 113422 in the Third District Court 
an action was tried bet"·een the respondents Ma1U1ing and 
the contract purchasers from the a p pell ants named Packard 
a~d 'vith a decision favorable to the Mannings (R. 3 8) . After 
losing that action~ the Packards and appellants Knaus signed 
an agreement which made Packards renters and was designed 
to restore a ppel I ants to full ownership as evidenced by a 
quit~claim deed (R. 23 and 24). 
This prior action v.ras pleaded as a bar to the present 
action (RT 14 Second De£ ense) , This issue was stated in the 
pretrial order as Item 5 (a) (R. 38). · 
By their counterclaim ( R. 4 2 and 4 3) and the pretrial 
order ( R. 39) respondents raised twu affirmative grou~ds 
for quieting their title against appellant, these being: firstt that 
they are t_he· ov.rner.s of the disputed strip by acquiescence and) 
second, that the disputed strip passed to Smith as an apput· 
. tenance to the purchase of the house from the cotnmon owner 
of all of the land. 
The court gave judgment to the respondent on the theory 
that the d 1 s pu ted strip can1e in to the owncrshi p of Smith as 
part of th€ house and lot at the purchase in 19 39 (Findings 
of Fact, and Conclusion of Law T\~o. 1) R. 551 56~ 57). 
Appellants have not s peci fie ally attacked a.ny of the 
·Findings of Fact~ although that is of necessity the burden of 
appellants. Respondents will therefore refer the court to the 
. ev_idence wh~ch sup ports the Findings of Factl and also to 
the e~.ldence from plaintifFs witnesses and uncontroverted 
. ·4 
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evidence £rom defendant's witnesses on the •ssue of res 
judicata 0 r estoppe 1 r 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no dispute as to the facts. supporting Findings of 
Fact Nos. 1~ 2, 3, and 4 (R+ 55). The deed to plainti_ff is 
• •: • I 
shown in the abstract, Exhibit 1 ~ p. 71. The Smi_ths sold to the 
Mannings all of Lot 1 and the east 10 feet of Lot 2 (Exhibit 
17) and used .the same description as on the deed to Smith 
(Smith Dep. p. 29). Smith purchased the land in 1939 and 
occupied it personally until 19 50 (Smith Dep~ p. 2) and. 
sold the property in 1954 (Smith Dep. p~ 3-Man~ing Dep. 3, 
19~ 2 0) . Common ownership of both tracts prior to. 1939 
is shown by the abstract (Exhibit 1 t pp. 39 and 51 apd by 
the Smith Deposition (p. 24 - R. 137~139). The sale by the 
common owner to Burt A. Hughes:t the predecessor. of pla_intiff t 
was in 1945 (Exhibit 1~ p+ 58). And the width of Lot 1. 
as beiJ;tg 54.1 feet is shown by the plat in tqe back of Exhibit 1+ 
Finding of Fact No. 5 is as follows: 
~~The land exhibited to the defendants Smith by the 
agent of the· seller appeared to have parallel east and 
west lines at a distance of 64. 1 £ eet from each other 
with a fence marking the east boundary and included 
a house~ garage and barn, with a driveway along the 
extreme _westerly portion of the apparent tract~ which 
was in open and obvious long standing use and was 
the. only means of ingress and egress to and from· the 
gar age and the barn and the south portion . of the 
property purchased by defendants ~mith of a total 
depth of approximately 500 feet and extending ap-
proximatejy 350 feet south of the house. 1 ' 
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-· 
James Ear 1 Smith testified in his deposition that he bought 
the pr?perty from William Linnell through Zions Savings 
B~nk . (Dep. 3) and t~at he \valked over the property along 
both sides and t 4 I defini.tel_y understood the dri ~ewa y was in~ 
eluded in _the prope~'· (Dep+ 4). The driveway ··\vas there 
a~d it s~emed to .fit the description of the p~o perty as I re-
cal~. Well, I kne,v it did o.r I "W~ouJdn't have bought itL" He 
.. understood that the property had straight lines as boundaries 
and a picket in the back of the lot was pain ted to as indicating 
the we:s t lin~ connecting with the horizontal striping on the 
sidewalk at the north end of the property~ the fence along the 
east boundary extending the whole length of the property 
( D ep+ 5 and 6) , except that the ea:s t fence ran into a chic ken 
coop and then continued on the other side (Dep. 6 and 7). 
The Peter son house was constructed five or six feet west of 
the \Vest line of the drive\va y (Dep. 7) ~ While Smith lived 
on the property there was no dispute about use of the drive· 
v.ray ( Dep. 7) there was no other way of getting into his 
gar~ge (Dep. 7) and no one living to the west attempted to 
use or control or claim the drive~ray (Dep. 8 and 9), the red 
barn at the rear was all on the property he purchased and the 
drivev,.yay exetnded ~Test of that barn (Dep. 12). Exhibit nA~" 
no\v Exhibit 13, has an arrow pointing to the separation crack 
and the west ~n d of the horizontal lines which marked the west 
end of his property on the front sidewalk (Dep. 6 and 14) ~ 
Peterson. constr~cted his home to the west in 1947. Prior to 
that Burt AL .Hughes had a garden on the property to the 
~est irrigated from a small irrigation ditch running northerly 
from the south, .fi.ye or six feet east of the east line of the 
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house Peterson built ( Dep. 18 and 19) . All of the driveway 
was necessary to get in and out of the garage (Dep. 27) . 
Burt A. Hughes testified that he purchased the property 
west of the old Linnell home March 29, 1945 from Linnell, 
who was his brother-in-law (R .. 15 3) . He had been_ acquainted 
with the property for some time and knew that the only way 
of reaching the outbuildings on the Linnell property was · 
over the driveway on the west side of the house. He was . 
s uff ic ientl y f a.miliar \Vi th the property that it was not n~essai"y 
to go over it before he made his purchase of all of the property 
except Lot 1 and the west 10 feet of Lot 2 (R. 154 and 155). 
He understood the boundary to be the east side of the irri-
gation ditch running north and south, west of the driveway 
(R. 15 5). The only way to reach the garage back of th.e house 
and facing west was through the driveway and turning,_ east 
into the garage (R. 155) r He sold the property to his daughter, 
\vho v...·as also familiar with the property as she had been down 
there on several ocasi ons when they were irrigating the garden 
(R. 156). There were tvlo poplar trees on the east side of 
the driveway (R. 159). He didn"t ever use the driveway 
while he owned the property (R. 155). 
John T. Barton testified that he occupied the house at 670 
East 4800 South from January, 1954 until the· fall of 195S;t 
\vhen Mr. Pack.1rd bought the property from Mr~ Knaus 
(R. 143-144). There was· a driveway on the west s.ide of the 
Knaus property and he d.ld not use the driveway to the east 
\vhich \V~lS about 40 inches east of his house and there were 
large boulders on the west side of the drive\vay along the 
north~south edge of it (R. 144). The redwood fence which 
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is. now on the property is approximately tv~:o feet east of the 
wes terrunost edge of the driveway as he recalls it ( R. 14 5) r 
There \Vas a peg ncar the sidewalk on the west of the Manning 
property and wher~ the bo_ulders. were on the east side he 
ass rnned ~T as _the property line (R. 146) . This peg is shown 
by the dot in a ~1rcle o~ ~xhibft 13 (R. 117). 
Ge~trude Skog testified that sh_e has lived at 671 East 
1800 South for 2~ years, across the street north from the prop-
erty in dispute. Ivlr. Lin.nell O\vned alJ of the property when 
she moved there (R. 138). When Mr. Smith bought his 
portion of the property there \\:ere fio~·ers where the Packard 
and Knaus house nO\V is and the drive\\Ta.y west of the Smith 
and Manning house has been there as long as .s.he can remem-
ber. It had not been .chat~ged nntil Mr. Mann.ing changed _it 
(R ... 139). The red fence is t\VO feet farther east than she 
.recalls the west edge of the drivt\vay (R. 139). The driveV!?ay 
ran straight south past the gar.age and back to the red barn 
(R·. 139) . The drive\v a y · was used to reach the· garage and 
the barn and she never sa Vot' the LinneUs get on to or off · of 
the property in any other tnanner (R. 110 and 141). 
1\1rs~ Lois Manning testi£ed that when she and her hus.-
band pu rchascd the Linr:tell property ther~. were a flower bed 
and .$ld ewalk v..~est of the house, then about ten £ ~et of la \\r n 
with trees on it and the drive~way \Vest of that with a garage 
and barn out in tbe back (Dep. 12). 
·Exhibit 6 is ·a 195 6 survey of the property which shows 
the di5tance along 48th South Street to be 64.16 feet between 
the east lot line and the Jine west of the east 10 feet of Lot 2, 
which is a pproxim a tel y in the ccn ter of the driveway. 1 t 
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shows the driveway· to extend almost precisely north and 
south back to a point in Lot 34 where there is a concrete slab 
upon which was situated the red b.arn. It will be noticed 
that the east fence is almost on the line of the east portion 
of this slab which accounts for the· description ·that the fence 
ran to the chicken coop and then continued south. 
Exhibit 6 sho\vs the measurement of 64.16 feet to run 
from the west edge of the present gravel driveway to the east 
edge of the survey line of Lot 1, with a space of 13.2 feet 
between the \vest edge of the present driveway and the east 
face of the Peterson-Kna u.s house. If the additional six feet 
shown on Exhibit 6 were subtracted from 13.2 lt would place 
the west edge of the original driveway 7.2 feet east of the 
'II 
east face of the Peterson-Knaus house. 
Finding of. Fact No. 6 reads as follows: 
HAt the titne of said sale to the defendants Smith 
the seller believed it was selling and the defendants 
Smith believed they were buying the land containing 
the house, garage and barn v.tith the land from the 
fen·ce on the east to the west edge of the said right 
of way) a distance of 64r 1 feet along the north line. >r 
(R. 56). 
Defend ant Smith testified that, ... Without the driveway:] 
I don~t think I would have wanted the property~'' And it was 
necessary in going in _and out of the garage to go to the west 
edge of the driveway (R. 27). 
Defendant Lois Manning te~tified in her deposition that 
when they bought the property from Smith there was a fence 
along the east side of the property where the white board fence 
') 
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iii 
is no\v located (Dep. 5). Defendant R. V. Mabning tes.ti.fied 
in his deposition that the lot which he agreed to purchase 
from Smith in June of 1954 was long and narrow with straight 
sides running north and south (Dep~ 22), at the west edge 
of the existing driveway ·~vas the west boundary of the property 
\Vhicb was pointed to as the property line ( Dep. 22) and 
that he '\\ras shown tb e fence as the east boundary and the west 
edge of the drivew·ay ·as the west boundary (Dep. 23). 
Finding of Fact No~ 7 .refers to a survey made by one of 
the predecessors of plain tiff on August 2, 1948, \V hlch was 
rei ied on by plain tiff's predecessors un ti ~ the summer of 19 56 
~Then defendant J\Ianning caused another survey to be made 
Vi-Thich showed the land occupied by defendant to He six feet 
cast of the 1 and they had thereto£ ore occ~.1 pied. The certi£ ea te 
of survey (Exhibit 18) shows the survey to have been tnade 
on August 2, 1948 as ref erred to by Mr. Fred J. Peterson 
(R. 166-167). The northeast stake was in the center of the 
irrigation ditch (R. 167) and was located by Mr~ Harton by 
a circle and dot on Exhibit 13 (R. 147) . This appears to be 
somewhat w· est of the line of the red fence on Ex hi bit 13. 
Mr. Peterson t es tifi ed that he never attempted to u.se 
the drive\vay (R. 165) as the driveway went with the Linnell-
Smith property ( R. 164) and he has at no time claimed to 
be o~vner of the driveway (R. 169). Mr. Peterson also testified 
that he drove a pickup truck betvt .. een his house and the ditch 
(R. 1 71 ) and that he allowed either seven or nine f e_et between· 
his house and ~is east line (R. 172). 
There was no dispute over the boundary between the 
properties until July or August) 1956 (R. 100) ~ a few days 
10 
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before the survey made by Bush and Gudgell on August 7, 
1956 (R. 101! Exrubits 6 and 16) + This was the t1me of the 
first dispute over the boundary (R. 101) + 
Finding of Fact No.8 recites that from 1939 to the swnmer 
of 19 56 all interested parties assumed that the land of plain tiffs 
and their predecessors lay west of the driveway (R+ 57). 
Defendant Manning testified that there was no dispute 
until 1956 (Manning Dep. 18, R. 100) . Barton a.sswned the 
boulders marked the property line ( R+ 146) ; Peterson ·made 
no claim to the driveway (R. 164, 165, 167, 169) and de· 
fend an r S~nith so testified (Smith Dep. 7"' 8) 9, 18~ 32) . 
Ira Packard testified that the old driveway 1·vas east of 
the red fence as now Jocated (R. 215) and tb.at the old irri· 
gation ditch woutd be west of the red fen~e (R. 216). 
Ira Packard also testified that he never used· the disputed 
driveway (R. 219) and that his conversation vidth defendant 
Manning .. a bout construction of the car port \vas after the 
Bush and Gudgell survey (R. 219). Packard entered into .a 
contract with Knaus on August 5~ 1955 for the purchase of 
the Knaus property (Ex. 21 , R+ 1 98) + He became acquainted 
with Mr. Manning three or four months later and the matter 
of the boundary was discussed on a more or less friendlJ 
basis until three or £our months before the action was startec 
by the Mannings (R. 200) . The file shows that this action 
\vas commenced in August 195 7. 
11 
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• 
ISSUE OF RES JUDICATA 
T'he .statements on the issue of res judicata contained in the 
foregoing recitals establish the fact that the def en dan ts Man· 
n ing are purchasing their property from the defendants Smith 
and that there is no contrt?versy behveen themr The file in 
Case K o. 11 3422 includes the intercogato r ies submitted by 
the Maonin gs to Smiths and the an Svlers there tor 
lt 1 s likewise uncontroverted that the Packards were 
purchasing from present plaintiffs under a Uniform Real 
Estate Contrali (Exhibit 21 ) I Plaintiff Knaus kne\Y of· the 
. earlier action but did not t es ti fy. Once "~hen Knaus \vas at 
the Packard ·home~ Packard mentioned '~that they were having 
a ~beef' with the neighboe' (Knaus Dep. 10). He had a 
telephone conversation with Packard approxitnately August 
1 0~ 195 7 in "W~hich Packard advised him of a letter from a 
Mr. B~rker) attorney for Manning~ _"that he .~ntended to start 
legal proceedin g5 to locate this disputed boundary line~' r and. 
Knaus told Packard that he didn't know anything about the 
boundary~ The personal conversation when Packard told him 
about the n tbeef' ~Tith the neighbor on the east,'~ \\ras some-
time later {R~ 238) ~ This was said to be a t'beef' abou_t the 
boundary line ( R~ 239) . 
Plaintiff makes some cLiim to an independent cause o£ 
action because Fred J~ Peterson gave a quit-claim deed in 1958L 
Fred J I Peterson \\'as a v.r i tness in the earlier .action, \V hich he 
knew to be over a boundary (R. 168) at which time he made 
no claim to being an owner of the driveway (R. 169). The 
deed (Exhibit 1~ p. 75) \vas given to clear up the title (R. 169) 
and he thinks he was given $5 for the deed (R. 1.71 ) ~ 
12 
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At the time of the tr j a 1 of this case; Ira Packard claimed 
to have no interest in the land (R. 213) by reason of a quit~ 
claim deed (R~ 21 _) and 24) and agreement (R. '23) . 
Mr. Packard testi.ficd that as soon as he was served with 
the paper from Mr. Barker, he employed an attorney, Mr. 
Hobbs~ and then called Mr r Knaus on the telephone and told 
him about the boundary trouble (R. 222) and after the com- .. 
plaint was filed he talked to Mr. Krfaus again and t-t told him 
that we were having property diHiculties and that I had hired 
J lawyer and that the thing had been set for trial and that 
\Ve were going to court over the property~' (R. 22 3) . He. did 
not tell Knaus that it ·was his responsibility or that he would 
have to clear up the question nor did he invite or require him 
to come in and defend the action (R. 222) 223) 224) nor did 
he say that if the action were lost he Vv~ould expect a~ adjust-
ment on the contract or that he would be dissatisfied 'v ith 
the property ( R. 224~ 225). The property was not _transferred 
to Knaus because of dis sa tis£ action over 1 osing the suit or the 
property (R. 227') 228) but becau,st Packard qjust wouldn~t 
like to live there any more,'~ although as far as the real es ta tc 
value l:s concerned it v..~ ouldn, t make much difference ( R. 228) . 
He was not willing to live next door to the Mannings any 
more (R.- 233). And Knaus paid him what he thought he 
should get for the property if sold to some third party (R. 233). 
Appellants or Mr. Packard employed Mr. Beatie to take 
over the case and handle the appeal (R. 208~ 221l 229] 230), 
in which notice of appeal viaS filed (R~ 209) and then aban-
don ed (R. 2 30) . Packard de£ erred to Knaus apparently lea vi.ng 
the decision tq him. or Mr. Beatie (R. 231). Mr. Knaus had 
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conversations with Mr. Reed and Mr. White, the Packards and 
~[r. Hobbs, Packard's .attorney~ ~Thile the decision on appeal 
of the pr~ious action was pending (Knaus Dep ~ 11-13) 
(Int. _·6~ R+ 22) + 
COMPOSING DIFFERENCES 
Counsel for plaintiff tried to make an admission of weak-
ness out of defendants ~tannings' willingness· to compose 
the ?ifficulty. In the first place~ the strip of Jand is probably 
not ~rorth any more intrinsica[ly than the strip to the ~ast of 
the Manning ho1ne which was purc:has ed for $200 (R. 113) . 
It has additional vaJu€ to defendant Manning because it gives 
access to the rear of the land v~rhich is 500 feet deep (R. 1.30 
and Exhibits .6, 16, 9, 13 and 1.4) 7 Mr. Manning testified a 
willingness to b~ y the land from Packard ( R. 131 ~ Manning 
Dep. 18 ~ 2 5) and he testified tbta he would rather give up the 
,-.,. 
strip in back than fight ·wit];l other neighbors over it (R. 123~ 
129) as a means of preserving friendship (R. 117, 137). 
POINTS RELIED ON 
Respondents submit that there are three questions in which 
this Court might be interested) the first one and perhaps the 
second on the appeal and the third and per haps the second 
on the cross a. ppeal: 
Point 1.. Was the drive\vay included in the sale to Smith 
by the common owner ? 
Point 2. Was the action between Ma.nnings and Packa rds 
res j ud~~a ta of this action and are plaintiffs estopped to maintain 
this action ? 
14 
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ARGUMENT 
1. WAS THE DRIVEWAY INCLUDED IN THE SALE 
TO SMITH BY THE COMMON OWNER? 
If this question is resolved in favor of the respondentj there 
J s no need to consider any other point on the appeal. 
Judge Ell etf s oral decision was that the conflicting surveys 
1n 1948 and 1956 and the understandings of the common 
owner .and the Smiths establish the property from the east 
to the west edge of the dri~eway as the property purchased 
(R. 241 ).' 
The judgment is supportable ori three bases: 
a. On the theory of practical location of the la.nd. 
b. The 1948 survey located the boundary as west of the 
driveway. 
c. The driveway was part of the home and lot. 
a. On the theory of practical location of the land. 
This is somewhat different from boundary by acquiescence 
although the two are related and frequently are discussed to-
gether without a clear 1 ine of dis tinction~ 
Tiff any on Real Property, Third Edition~ Section 6 5 5, thus. 
exp la.ins the doctrine: 
~ ·~ot in£ requently reference is made to the 'practical 
1 oca tion' · by the par ties to a conveyance~ of the bound.a ry 
or boundaries refer red to therein. This expression refers 
to a designation of the line by agreement bernTeen 
the gran tee and the gran tor~ the I a tter retaining the 
ad joining land~ followed by possess ron in accordance 
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ill 
therewith, or to posses sian up to a certain line by 
each of the parties, ~· ithou ~ any s ~ecllic agreement. * * 
... The expression practical location of the boundaries 
has also been applied to the location made by the 
com~on grantor. Where this location is accepted and 
acquiesced in, it is the true location arid binding~ w itb-
out r~gard to the lapse of time." · -
And tlike,vise Thorn pson on Real Property, Permanent Edition~ 
Section 3301: ~ 
-=·under proper cira1mstances~ there may be a prac~ 
tical location of a doubtful boundary line by an agree~ . 
ment bet-vio·een the adjoining O\vners, followed by acqui-
escence in the location made and occupancy in accord-
ance there~vith, which will be binding both on such 
owners themselves and on their grantees . . . A prac-
tic a 1 location made by a mutual grantor is binding 
on the grantees, for it is presumed to be the line men-
tioned jn the deeds.' 1 
Tiff .any cites· H et"S e tJ'S. A-1 ezza, 10 App~ Div. 59} 91 NYS 
78~ which holds under similar facts that the doctrine aplies and 
no lapse of time is necessary r Thorn pson cites, among other 
cases~ Young vs. Hyland, 3 7 U~ 229~ 108 p. 1124. 
Young t's. f! y land is quite similar to the case at bar. 
plain tiff \VaS deeded a lot 34.6 feet by 141 . 5 feet v.ri tb the 
south line of Lot 10 of a qSouth Ogden Surveyn .as his south 
boundary. Defendant was deeded a part or Lot 11 so that the 
south boundary of plaintiff and the north boundary of de-
fend~t were coterminous, both by deed and by occupancy. 
A fence existed at the supposed south boundary five feet south 
of .a I a ter survey 1 ine which had rep laced earll er and. successive 
fences. At the times of purchase by plaintiff and his prede-
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cesso r s each had been shown the land as being bounded by 
the fen(e. The original survey was not _identified by monuments 
and the later survey ~vas made after the controversy arose. The 
trial court found for defendant and this court reversed~ holding 
. . 
that there was a pr actica 1 location of the boundary at the 
fence line which was acquiesced in for many years by the 
parties and their predeces~sors. The court said; 
~;:The plain tiff tes t~fied that~ ~Then he bought the 
land~ the agent of his grantor went v,;T i th h i.m on the 
ground, and told him that it ;: runs to the fence· t j p. · 
232. 
~·A practica lloca tion of a boundary line rna y be, .and 
often is~ agreed upon) fixed~ and established) either 
by an expre:S s agreement, or by acquiescence, v.dthou t 
surveys. It may be so agreed to and fixed before~ as 
well as after, the making of an official survey .. The 
practic~l location so fixed may be in accordance or 
in conflict with such survey. When the tract V/ as ta id 
off into city lots and blocksj we do not see any reason 
why the lando\\·n ers tould not thereafter adopt a 
fence] which was then there] as the boundary line 
between lots 1 0 and 11 to the same effect a5 though · 
they had thereafter constructed, or agreed uponj or 
·acquiesced in) ... a new fence~ as and for the boundary 
line'" p.. 234. 
t
4 {t is a well~settled rule of la\v~ resting upon public 
policy, that a practical 1 ocation of boundar ic.s vl hich 
has been acquiesced in for a long period of years will 
not _be disturbed. It is binding on the parties thereto 
and their privies in estate. This doctrine has been 
ad opted as a rule of repose VoJT i th a v iev{ of quieting 
titles and preventing 1 i ti gati on'~ p. 2 3 5. 
~'The per tin en t question r s not where is the south~ 
east corner of Lot 10 and the south boundary line of 
17 
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• 
the lot coextensive therewith) according to some par-
ticular official survey. made by or under the direction 
of Ogde:n City, but, as between the adjoining land-
qwn ers, where is tha. t point·· as it wa.s originally fixed 
and establisheq by an original or primary survey, or 
by a practical location agreed upon or acquiesced in 
for a Ion g period of time by the persons in tere.sted ~ ~ 
p. 2·37~ 
In the instant case the practical location was by the com-
mon grantor .and the second survey~ in 1948, evidently con-
firmed the original survey~ according to which the east fence 
was built and the common grantor had occupied~ as well as 
making the p r ru.: tic a i location of the boundary with both 
grantees. Only the 19 56 survey created the conflict. 
Practical location establishes the boundary and binds the 
parties~. Subsequent survey~ and acquiescence are not essential 
and do not change the boundary~ although Young vs. Hyland 
found both practical location and long acquiescence. 
It has been cited numerous times by this Court, the in-
stances most helpful to the facts of this case being Warren 
v. A1azzuchi1. 45 U. 612, 616, 148 P. 360, (line established on 
line indicated by co1nmon grantor) ; Nelson vs. DaRouc h, 
87 U. 45 7, 4 66, 50 P. 2d 2 73, (practical boundary disrnssed) ; 
Hurnmel vs. Young~ 1 U. 2d 237, 243, 265 P. 2d 410, (purpose 
is to stabilize titles a.nd prevent ii tiga tion) . 
b .. The 1948 survey located the boundary as u~est of the drit.=e-
u~ay. 
Evidence of this survey was received without objection~ 
from Fred J. Peter~on (R+ 166~167) and John Barton (R. 146). 
The first survey of the subdivision is evidenced by Exhibit 1 
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p. 2 3 anJ the plat in the back thereof. The third survey IS 
shown by Exhibits 6 and 16. 
These facts create an uncertainty which was properly re. 
solved through parol evidence~ Detroit, Grand Haven and 
Milwaukee Railroad vs. Ho\\rland~ 246 Mich. 318~ 224 N~W. 
) GG ~ 68 ALR 1 and annotation following~ especially pp. 5 ~ · 
47~49, 74-76, arid 78. Page S of the annotation defines a latent 
ambiguity which rna y be resolved by evidence as arising when 
a plain de~cription is applied to the land. See Moye1· -z-·x. 
Langton~ 37 lJ. 9, 16, 106 P. 508. 
t". The dt<iveway WaJ part of the home and lot. 
The evidence amply supports an easement lfl favor of 
Smith over the driveway. There was a conveyance by the 
common owne:r, there ·was an open and obvious and long· 
standing use of the driveway to reach the garage and other 
outbuildings on the property being sold, and there was no other 
reasonable and available means of reaching the rear portion 
of the property. T honlpJon_ vs. N elJon, 2 ·u. 2nd 340 at 346] 
273 P 2nd 720; Adam_ron vs. Brockbank) 1.1 2 U. 52~ 18 5 P 2nd 
264 (reasonable necessity is sufficient); Rollo vs~ N elsonf 
34 lJ. 116, 96 P 263, 26 L.R.A. (NS 315); Thompson, Real 
Property] Section 339. 
. 
The on I y difficult qu es t.ion is w hethcr full ownership 
of the driveway passed to Smith under the cin_umstances of 
this case. It is plain that the common owner believed that he 
·was selling the house and the d r i vew .a y since the fence to the 
east and west line of the driveway \Vere pointed out as the 
boundaries and the west boundary \Vas pointed out as running 
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from the western edge of the horizontal markings in the side-
walk to a post in the fence at the rear of the land. The 
description used was of Lot 1 plus 10 feet of Lot 2l making 
a total 0 f 64 r 1 feet, which is the amount 0 f Land CITI braced 
betw-een the east fence and the 'vest line of the driveway 
according to Exhibits 6 and 16. Under these circumstances, 
the land conveyed included the driveway as part of the tractl 
the .d~ive~ay being appurtenant to the house and outbuildings. 
U~der the title t~appurtenance'' in 6 C.J.S. pp. 136, appears 
this st.a tetnent: 
I. 
' {In a technical sense~ it has be eo said~ land can never 
be an appurtenance to land; but where from the con· 
. text and the facts of the particular case an intent to 
pass land is rnanife~t, the courts will heed the intent 
and the 1 and \··vi 11 be treated as an appurtenance.'' 
Thompson on Re.al Property has this to say: 
~~where plaintiff in ejectment offered evidence that 
the former owner pointed out certain landmarks and 
corners claimed by him to shoVtr the locd.tion of the 
boundaries of his land~ it was held that, since plaintiff's 
title was to be determined by the location of such 
former owt:~er' s corners:t evidence of the marks and 
corners as pointed out was primary and not hearsay 
and \Vas admissible to show tb e true location as under-
stood by the parties at the time~' Section 3285. 
And again; 
~'It is always competent to give in ev i dcnce ex is tin g 
circumstances~ such as the actual condition and si tua-
t ion of land, buildings, passages~ water courses~ and 
local objects in order to give. definite meaning to the 
language used in a deed and to show the sense in which 
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particular words \ver e u~ ed by the pa.rtles, es pecia 11 y 
10 matters of descriptionl' Section 3287~ 
It is plain that when Mr. Linnell ref erred to Lot 1 and to 
the east 10 .feet of Lot 2~ he was referring to Lot 1 as starting 
at the eastern fence and that he believed that the driveway was 
on Lot 2 and he therefore included the easterly 10 feet of that 
lot. 
In American J ur i5 prudence) Section 295 of Deeds and 
Conveyances, it is said: '"Land may, however, be made appur-
tenant to other land by the intent and acts of the parties:t'' 
citing Sic! el v.r. Lauer~ 148 Pa. 2 36, 23 A. 996, and Alford rs. 
Rodgers; 242 Ala. 3 70, 6 So. 2nd 409~ and further that, nland 
adjacent to the building must pass -vtr here circumstances show 
that the grantor must have intended to convey it.'~ Citing 
Maddox t··s. Goddat·d, 15 Me. 218~ 33 Am. Dec. 604, where 
the words, ~~one-quarter of the Durgin Sa\vmllr~ incJuded as 
much land a5 was necessary and customarily used. 
In the Siet el case~ supra, a statute vested in counties~ jails 
and the portions of land appertaining to the jails and the court 
was cons truing a deed conveying a jail with this statute also 
before it and said: 
''\X/ hi 1 e~ as a general rule, land cannot be a ppur-
tenant to LaH.L yet it may be made so by the intent 
ancl acts of the parties. * * * 11 he use of this strip 
of land permitted by the deed of lst December~ 1772, 
indicates such an intention., at least sufficiently to 
permit it to be regarded as an appurtenance to the jail 
property within the spirit of. the act of 1834:t and] 
as such~ t(} the extent of the estate held by the com~ 
missioners to have thereby become vested in the county 
of Berks~·· 
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The driveway in this case never has been used by anyone 
. else· and never will be used by the plaintiffs, since the driveway 
to their garage lies w~st of their house. It would seem a futile 
thing to give the driveway to the defendants for their exclusive 
use and withhold title. Such ~vas not the intent of the parties, 
who clearly supposed tha. t the driveway was included with 
the description and intended that the driveway should go \Vith 
the house, the garag~ and the other outbuildings. 
2. HAS· THE BOUNDARY BEEN ESTABLISHED BY 
ACQUIESCENCE AT THE WEST LINE OF THE DRIVE· 
WAY? 
The recent cases decided by this Court, .and the artie I e in 
3 Utah Law Retii eu~ on establishment of boundaries by acqui-
escence have perhaps made counsel overly interested in this 
doctrine, with a tendency to lneasure all cases thereby. The 
salient feature of the doctrine is that it is one of repose~ to 
enable parties to continue in possessiqn of their accepted lru t ds 
and to avoid ~itigation. To this same end are the doctrines of 
ad verse possessjon, boundary by practical location, estoppel, 
and acceptance of evidence to explain latent ambiguities in 
deeds. \X1h ether the facts of this case fit most closely the rule 
of boundary by acquiescence is for this Court to decide~ 
In the first tria 1 of this controversy, Case ~r (} _ 113 4 2 2 J 
the tria.l Court held that the Mannings were entitled to the 
drive~~ay on the theori.e.s of both boundary by acquiescence 
and that the driveway was appurtenant to the Linnell-Smith 
home. In the present case, Judge Ellett decided the case on the 
theory of practical location of the boundary or parol evidence 
to establish an intended boundary. Not knowing how this 
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Court \\·'ill vie\v the £acts~ respondents cross appealed to bring 
before this Court the theory of boundary by acquiescence. 
This Court we 11 knows the requirements of the doctrine~ as 
expressed in sev era! recent cases. We shall therefore present 
to the Court on 1 jl the three aspects of tb is doctrine which, 
it appears to respondents~ might be questioned under the facts 
of . this ca.se: 
a. Did a dispute or uncertainty exist? 
b. Is the boundary line established ? 
c. What is the statu tory or other period of req nired acqu i-
escence? 
a. Did a diJpute or uncertainty exiJt? 
It 1s undisputed that the western boillldary of this property, 
at the wes~ern edge of the driveway, was believed by the 
common grantor to be described in the deed to Smith and 
the deed to Burt A. Hughes. Mr. Linnell established the drive-
way as a convenience, believing that his home ,..,. as si tria ted on 
Lot 1, which extended 54.1 feet to the eastern edge of the 
driveway and that the driveway Vv~as 10 feet in width and 
occupied the easterly 10 feet of Lot 2. The dispute or un~ 
certainty must therefore be implied or be found to exist as a 
matter of law because the actua I location of the boundary was 
in fact uncertain and the subject matter of an inchoate dispute. 
If the doctrine be correctly described as nbounda.ry by acqui~ 
escence ~} then the acquiescence should be the sa lien t £ eatu r e 
and not the fictional settlement of a difference. This Court 
has said that the fictional agreement is so definitely established · 
by the 1 on g period of acquiescence that evidence of it . is p rc-
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ciuded and immaterial. Motzkus VJ Cat-rollj 7 u~ 2d 237 at 
244, -322 p .. 2d 3914 . 
It would seem that; vie~·ing the doctrine as one of rep:>se, 
the dispute or . uncertainty also becomes a fictional thing, as 
indeed it does from· the ruling that the dispute will be pre-
sumed (Mot:Zkus vs. Carroll, supra, at p. 243) and wtcertainty 
as to the accurate locatio~ of tbe boundary, either subjective 
or objective~ should be .su.ff icient This is contrary· to the 
suggestion in 3 Lr tab Law Review at. p. 511 ~ which suggests 
that there must be a su bj ecti ve uncertainty. 
In Willie vs. Local Realty Co., 110 U~ 52~ at 531, 175 
P 2d 718 at 723~ and Ekberg vs. Bates, 121 V~ l23 at 127, 239 
P. 2d 205~ this Court held that the fact that the correct boundary 
could b~ rea.dil y ascertaine<J did not eliminate the requisite 
uncerta.lnty. That doesn't ans~·er our situation where all paJ:"ties 
· assumed the indicated boundary was correct when in fact 
surveyors could not agree as to its correctness and there was 
an objective o! d etno n.strabl e uncertainty. 
In Glenn vs. Whitney, 116 U. 267 at 272-273~ 209 P~ 2d 
2 57, the Court ~eems to hold that lack of awareness of un-
c.ertainty is not enough+ And yet in M.otzkus vs. Carroll, supra~ 
·at p. 243~ the Court quotes from Brown vs. Milliner that un-
certainty ~\vill be implied from the parties' long acquiescence~'t 
If the parties know where the true boundary is, they 
generally cannot trans fer title by an oral agreement on a 
diHerent .line. Jensen vs. Bartlettj 4 lJ. 2d 58~ 60, 286 P. 2d 804. 
In the following cases the parties had a survey made 
and relied on· the survey as es tablj shing the boundary, having 
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no doubt or ·uncertainty as to. the sufficiency of the survey. 
Following sufficient periods of acquiescence, later surveys 
established the error of the boundary line upon which they 
had relied. In each case, the Court held that a sufficient un. 
certainty existed in their minds to satisfy the requirement pf 
boundary by acquiescence, \V hich uncertainty was evidenced by 
their reliance ltpon a .:;urvey. Silva tJ_L Azevedo, 178 Cal. 495~ 
17? P. 929; lHoniz tJS, Peterman~ 220 Cal. 429} 31 P 2d 353; 
13euson t--'J. Daily, 38 Neb. 155, 56 NW 788. These situations 
are s~milar to tbe facts of this case, where the parties were 
uncertain as to the land they \vere purchasing and relied on 
ljnnell~ \vho pointed out to them the boundary as being 'vest 
of the drive,vay. They relied on this, occupied up to 1t~ built 
in reliance on it~ and claimed nothing on the far side as in 
the cases cited. These cases are consistent with the theory of 
repose. ln these cited cases 7 the parties were dividing tracts 
of land and sirnply had a surveyor indicate ~~here the division 
line was. This actualJy involved no uncertainty whatever but a 
\villingness to rely on someone~ s advice in locating the boundary 
between them. 
T"his type of evidence, being consistent ~·ith the rea$onlng 
of these cases~ does not rebut the presumption of the existence 
of a d ls. p u te or uncertainty fo llo'v ed by an agreement settling 
the uncertainty and fixing the J ine. 
/;. Is the boundary line established? 
Many of the cases refer to fences as the visible evidence of 
the line established by the parties by agreerru~nt and acqui· 
esced in for long times. In iWatzkus VJ. Carrol( supra, the Court 
quoted from Brown t.'J, Milliner that ... the line must be open~ 
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1!1 
visible, marked by monuments, fences o.r buildings.~~ In that 
ca"se the Court found sufficient a string of posts with . two 
strands of wire~ the posts varying in thicknes~ anc many of 
them out of repair and leaning~ In the case at bar the boundary 
was. indicated by the side of a well-traveled driveway, by the 
b2:nk of an irrigation ditch~ by boulders placed along the edge 
of the driveway, by a surveyor~ s stake placed in front, by 
· picket ·on the fence at the rear and by separation cracks in the 
sidewalk with verticaL 1 ines running to the separation crack, 
and by trees along the westerly edge, and a house to the west 
A ppellan.ts argue in their brief that the '~true ~oundary ,, 
w~s recognized and that this defeats the acquiescence. In the 
first place, 1 earning of the location o £ the true boundary must 
al~ays occur before a question of acquiescence can arise. And 
secondly~ abandoning the acquieSced bpundary at the rear 
. t'l 
does not affect the boW1dary up front Rydatch vs. Anderson, 
3 7 u~ 99, 1os, 111~ 112 . 
. . . The west line of the driveway is now obliterated except 
on the survey (Exhibit 6) + Some of the evidence locates it 
two feet west of the redwood £ eoce (Exhibit 13 ~ R~ 14 5 ~ 1 39) . 
Th c fence was built in accordance with the decree in the earlier 
case and in this case it was confirmed by the decree. It .ls 64.1 
feet west of the east fenc~ and at the west line of the driveway 
according to most of the evidence (R. 167, 171~ 172, 215, 
Exhibits 6, 9)· 14). 
c. What is the statutory or othet" period of required acquies-
cence? 
In Motzkus vs. Carroii1 the Court finds acqu1escence 
for a s uff icien t period ~ tw hether it takes only seven years or 
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more than twenty years)'' in die a ting the possibility that the 
question is still open. But in Hkberg l-'J. Bate.s, supra, the Court 
held that acquiescence for eight years was more than enough 
under Section l 04-2-6 UCA 1943, which is now 78-12·6 UCA 
l \}) _). 
3. WAS THE ACTION BETWEEN MANNINGS AND 
PACKARDS RES JUDICA1~A OF THIS ACTION AND ARE 
• 
PLAiNTIFFS ESTOPPED TO MAINTAIN THIS ACtiON? 
This question was raised in the pleadings:t at the pre--trial, 
and by motion for summary judgment .and \vas .finally. disposed 
of by the trial judge with these words: 
~·1 don't think there is anything to this res adjudicata 
business. I think it is a law suit that has to be tried 
over b eca.us e somebody didn · t ·make these owners par-
tics in interest, but I don~t think there is any question 
at all but what this taw suit would be just the same 
as if it were bet~veen Linnell and Slnith * * * '' . (R. 
240-241). 
This point is covered briefly, not so much to urge it upon 
the Court~ as to bring it before the Court in the event the Cou ~t 
is unable to agree with the trial Court in its disp~sition of this 
case) or with the theory o £ boundary by acqui escencc as accepted 
by the trial Court in the first trial of this controversy. 
It is plain that the issues in Case No. 113422 and in the 
instant case are the same, and that the property involved is 
the same. It is also plain that the parties are different~ on 1 y 
the Mannings being parties in both actions with no diff~rences 
between the respondents, and the question therefore is whether 
the pia in tiffs in this E tigation are in privity \Vi th the de fen dan ts 
to the earlier case. 
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In Rody vs; i\1oyle) ( Md.) 29 A. 2nd 290, the plaintiff 
sought to. relitigate ownership of funds, having testified in 
a former action in which he was not a party, and the court 
said: 
qPersons who are directly interested in the suit! and 
have knowledge of its pendency., and who refuse or 
neglect to appear and a vail themselves of their rights~ 
are concluded by the proceedings as eliectually as if 
they ~vere parties named on the record. 't 
Slight evidence of privity ~·ill support estoppel for prior 
adjudication where the issues are the same) as public policy 
requires an end of litigation. Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi Cola~ 36 
Del. .124~ 172 A. 260; Dupont deNemout"J vs. Richmond Guano 
Co., (C.A. Va.), 297 Fed 580: 
~~A suit duly prosecuted in good faith~ and followed 
by a judgment or ·decree, is constructive notice to ever j; 
person who acquires from a defendant, pendente lite 
an interest in the subject matter of the litigation) of 
the legal and equitable rights of the plaintiff, as charged 
in the bill or complaint, and established by the judg-
ment or decree.~~ Freeman on Judgments~ Section 188. 
t4.0ne who is neither a party or privy or purchases 
pendente J ite] is not bound, but he who purchases or 
goes into possession during the pendency of the suit 
is bound by the decree that is made against the person 
from \Vhom he derives title. The law is that he who 
intermeddles ~;ith property in litigation does it at hts 
peril~ and is as conclusively bound by the results of 
the litigation, \vhatever they may be, as if he had been 
a party to it from the outset. It Herman on Judgments} 
Section 186~ 
The plaintiffs knew of the li~igation benv.een the Mannings 
and Packards and didn ~ t testify because they knew nothing 
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about the boundary~ They consulted with Mr. Hobbs and with 
Mr. Beatie while the decision to appeal was pending, later 
obtained a deed to a foot of ground from Pred J. Peterson, 
who. testified at the earlier case, and then b rough t this action 
to relitigate the same question+ '"fhere was not a rescission of 
the contract as a rna tter of right or for failure of consideration; 
but the P ackards sold the land back to the plain tiff bee .a use 
they didn't want to live there any more (R. 228) and because 
the plaintiff gave them \V hat they would expect anyone eJ se 
to give ( R. 233) + Plaintiffs in effect bought out Packard and 
stand in Packard~s shoes; they knew of the litigation as it was 
pending) a.nd they kne\v that the appeal was being a ban cloned. 
The poI icy against m u 1 ti pl ici ty of sui t5 over the same question 
invites the holding that the first action ~T as an adjudication 
as to the parties n O\V be fore the court~ \V ho were privies to t h c 
parties in the earlier action. 
CONCLUSION 
A large number of witnesses was called, several d~posi­
tions were taken and a number of in terra gatories ~·ere sub~ 
mitted in order to bring before the trial court all relevant 
facts concerning the. right to continue to occupy this six foot 
strip of ground. 1"he court was v..rell informed and concluded 
that it had been the obvious intent of the parties that this .. 
ground pass to the Smiths and oot to the parties to the v.,· est 
of the driveway) which con clus.ion v.~ as confirmed by the 
conflicting _surveys+ 1~he. court adopted the recent Bush and 
Gudgell survey as the bas ~s for the description quieting 
title) wtihout deciding 1;vhich of the surveys accurately locates 
the ground. 
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• 
The decision of the District Court is amply supported by 
the evidence and should be a£f irmed without modification. 
Defendants also pre sen ted evidence on the theories · of 
boundary by acquiescence and res judicata ·by a former trial. 
The evidence of boundary by acquiescence amply shows that 
the parties occupied up to- the west line of the driveway and 
rna de no claim across tha.t line, that it was a well-designed 
boundary marked by boulders, trees and a post in the fence at 
the back end and by a separation crack and later by a surveyor~ s 
. p~g at the north end. There was acquiescence for eleven years 
from 1945 to 1956, or if the court looks at the date August 2, 
1948~ when P.eterson had a survey made, there was acquiescence 
for approximately eight years to the time in 1956 when. a later 
survey \\ras made+ 
The plaintiffs in this action were fully aware of the pri-or 
li ti gati on and v.rer e cons u 1 ted to determine \V hether they had 
any evidence bearing on the issues of that case~ Under these 
circumstances plaintiffs should be estopped from relitigating 
these issue.s and the prior adjudication should stand. 
All of t h c doctrines discus sed relate to the policy to end 
disputes with reference to land boundaries where the bound-
aries have long been established and fully recognized~ The 
judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. 
_Respectfully submitted~ 
C. PRESTON ALLEN and 
RICHARD L~ BIRD~ JR. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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